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Abstract 
This paper studies the implementation of a regulation problem of China in which the energy industry's private 
information is unknown to the state-owned assets supervision and administration commission of the state council 
(SASAC). It's reasonable to use a fuzzy variable to denote the subjective assessment of the SASAC to the private 
information. A principal-agent model is then set up to maximize the welfare of the SASAC. Pontryagin maximum 
principle is adopted in this paper to obtain the necessary condition of the optimal solutions. 
 
 
Keywords: Asymmetric information; Principal-agent model; Regulation; Energy industry; Fuzzy variable 
1. Introduction 
Recent developments in incentives theory of regulation have drawn  more and more attention to price 
regulation, regulation system, regulation of political and so on. Bardey et al [1] was a first attempt to 
evaluate the long run impact of reference pricing on pharmaceutical innovation. Gherasim [2] explained 
the price regulation mechanis m. Maddock [6] addressed how regulation of the environment was altering 
economic regimes. Katayama [4] researched the relat ionship between the Japanese political culture and 
the system of government regulation. Wang [7] studied a static Bayesian game with the uncertain types 
characterized as fuzzy variab les. Laffont [5] had introduced the incentives theory of regulation to 
development countries. In the financial crisis situation, the question of regulation in  developing countries 
has become increasingly important. 
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In China, the energy industry is an important part of Chinese national economy. In order to improve the 
efficiency of the energy industry, it's essential to strengthen the supervision of action of the energy 
industry. This paper studies a regulation problem on energy industry in China under asymmetric 
informat ion. The state-owned assets supervision and administration commission of the state council 
(SASAC) is a principal, and the energy industry is an agent. The paper establishes a principal-agent model 
of this problem and gives a necessary condition of optimal solutions. At last, by giving a numerical  
example, we obtain the optimal solution and analyze the economic significance of the optimal solution. 
2. The Model 
For strengthening the supervision of action of the energy industry, Chinese government delegates the 
SASAC to supervise and administrate the energy industry. Hence, the SASAC and  the energy industry is 
a principal-agent relationship, where the SASAC is a principal, and the energy industry is an agent. 
Let x  be a type of the energy industry, e  an expected action that the SASAC hopes the energy 
industry taking to complete a project. Here, e  is a function of x . The cost of the project, denoted by 
( , ( ))C x e x , can be observed by the SASAC. Thus, when the true type of the energy industry is x , but 
he claims  the type is y , the cost of the project observed by the SASAC is also ( , ( ))C y e y . In this case, 
the real action taken by the energy industry is denoted by ( , ( , ( )))g x C y e y . The disutility function of 
the action is ( )e\ . Assume the project  brings the social welfare S  for the consumers. The SASAC 
provides a transfer payment ( )t C  to the energy industry for the p roject. According to  the revelat ion 
principle [3], the SASAC can design a direct mechanism ( ( ), ( ))U x e x  to the energy industry. 
The follow assumptions will be made throughout the whole paper. 
(i) The type of the energy  industry is his private in formation, which is the subjective assessment of the 
SASAC, so it is reasonable to use a fuzzy variable [  to denote it. The support of [  is denoted by 
[0, ]b: , where b  f . The credibility density function is denoted by ( )xI . 
(ii) ( ) 0e\ c ! , ( ) 0e\ cc t . 
(iii) ( , ( )) > 0C x e x
x
w
w , 
( , ( ))
< 0C x e x
e
w
w , 
( , )
> 0g x C
x
w
w , 
( , )
< 0g x C
C
w
w , 
2 ( , ) 0g x C
x C
w dw w . 
(iv) d ( ) d 0t x x t . ( )t x kd , which means that the transfer payment is not more than k . 
(v) The utility function of the energy industry is defined as  ( ) = ( ) ( , ( )) ( ( )).U x t x C x e x e x\   
(vi) The welfare function of the SASAC is defined as  
( ) = ( ) [ (1 ) ( )] ( ) (1 )( ( , ( )) ( ( ))),V U S t S U C e e[ [ E [ E [ E [ [ \ [         
where the parameter > 0E  is the distortionary effects of taxation. 
Let ( , ) ( ) ( , ( )) ( ( , ( , ( ))))x y t y C y e y g x C y e yM \   , ( ) ( , )U x x xM . In order to induce the 
energy industry to show truthfully  the private information, the incentive compatibility  constraint of the 
energy industry is written as  
                                                            ( , ) ( , ), .x x x y yM Mt  :                                                      (1) 
In order to enable the energy industry to participate in the project, the SASAC must offer to the energy 
industry a utility level which is at least as high as the opportunity cost. We normalize to zero the energy 
industry's opportunity cost, and the participation constraint of the energy industry is written as  
                                                                 ( ) 0, .U x xt  :                                                               (2) 
According to the incentive compatibility constraint (1) and the participation constraint (2), the 
principal-agent model can then be written as  
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3. Model Analysis 
Proposition 1  The incentive compatibility constraint (1) is equivalent to 
                                      
d ( ) d ( ) ( , ( , ( )))
=
d d
( , ( )) ( , ( )) d ( ) 0.
d
U x e g x C x e x
x e x
C x e x C x e x e x
x e x
\ w­  °° w®w w°   t° w w¯
                                     (4)  
Proof. For any fixed x , ( , ) ( , )x x x yM Mt . It follows the first order condition that 
           
d ( ) ( , ( )) ( , ( )) d ( ) d ( ) ( , ( , ( )))
= 1 .
d d d
t x C x e x C x e x e x e g x C x e x
x x e x e C
\w w w§ ·§ ·   ¨ ¸¨ ¸w w w© ¹© ¹         (5) 
By taking (5) to substitute into d ( ) dU x x , we can have 
                                              
d ( ) d ( ) ( , ( , ( )))
= .
d d
U x e g x C x e x
x e x
\ w  w                                             (6)  
Furthermore, it follows from the second condition that 
                                              
( , ( )) ( , ( )) d ( ) 0.
d
C x e x C x e x e x
x e x
w w  tw w                                             (7)  
Hence, (1) (4) . 
On the other hand, assume that (4) holds that 
                                                   ( , ) > ( , ), , ,x y x x y y xM M  : z                                                  (8) 
Since 
=
( , ) | = 0y xx yy
Mw
w , (8) is equivalent to  
                                                               
2 ( , ) d d > 0y x
x z
q z q z
q z
Mw
w w³ ³                                                          (9) 
 If >y x  and for [ , ]z x y , 
2 ( , ) d d 0y x
x z
q z q z
q z
Mw dw w³ ³ , which leads to a contradiction with (9). 
Therefore, the assumption (8) is not true. We can conclude that (4) (1) . The proof is complete. 
Proposition 2  The participation constraint (2) is equivalent to 
                                                                          ( ) = 0.U b                                                                    (10) 
Proof. It follows from assumption (vi) that d ( ) d 0U x x  . Because ( ) 0U x t , so ( ) 0.U b t  Since 
the utility of the energy industry has the social cost, the constraint is binding. That is ( ) = 0.U b   
Proposition 3  The expected value of the principal's welfare function is equivalent to  
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Proof. Let ( ) = ( ) (1 )( ( , ( )) ( ( )))P x S U x C x e x e xE E \    . It follows from d ( ) d 0U x x   
and assumption (v) that d ( ) d 0P x x  . It follows from [8] that 
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0
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Theorem 1 The model (3) can be converted into the following form: 
                 
> @
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Proof. Based on the above propositions 1-3, the model (3) could be proved. 
Let d ( ) d ( )e x x l x . In order to solve Model (11), which can be converted into the optimal control 
model, where ( )l x  is the control variable, ( )U x  and ( )e x  are the state variables. We can use the 
Pontryagin maximum principle to obtain the necessary condition of optimal solutions. 
To begin with, we express the Hamiltonian ( , , , , , )H x U e l O P  as follows: 
           
> @( , , , , , ) = ( ) (1 )( ( , ( )) ( ( ))) ( )
d ( ) ( , ( , ( )))
  ( ) ( ) ( ).
d
H x U e l S U x C x e x e x x
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       (12)  
The canonical system of differential equations : 
                                                     
d ( ) d ( )
= =
d d
d ( )
= = ( ).
d
H x H U x
U x x
H x H l x
e x
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O
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P
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                                                 (13) 
*( )l x  maximizes (12), namely: *
( , ( )) ( , ( ))
( , , , , , ) = ( , , , , , ).max
C x e x C x e xl
x e
H x e U l H x e U lO P O P
w wd w w
 
Boundary conditions 
                                                               
0( ) = 0 ( ) =
(0) = 0 (0) = 0,
U b e b m
O P
­®¯ ˈˈ                                                       (14)  
where 0 { ( ) | ( , ( )) ( ( )) = 0}.m e b k C b e b e b\    
4. Numerical Example 
Let [  be a triangular fuzzy variable (0, , )a b  with <b f . Assume that ( , ( )) = ( )C x e x x e x , 
( ( )) = 2 ( )e x e x\ .  
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The Hamiltonian ( , , , , , )H x U e l O P  of the optimal control model is  > @( , , , , , ) = ( ) (1 )( ( )) ( )H x U e l S U x x e x xO P E E I    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x e x x l xO P  . 
It fo llows from the necessary condition of optimal solutions that d ( ) d 0x xP ! , which indicates that 
( )xP  is an increasing function. Considering the boundary condition (0) = 0P , we conclude that ( )xP  
is non-negative. According to the necessary conditions, we know the optimal solution *( ) =1l x ; 
consequently, * 1( ) =e x x m . Since ( ) =e b k b  and ( ) = 0U b , we get *( ) = 2e x x k b   and 
*( ) = 2 2 .U x x b   Furthermore, *( ) =t x k , which means the SASAC takes fixed-price contacts. And 
it's the largest transfer payment, which the SASAC could pay. In some sense, it can stimulate economic 
growth in China. The following we discuss the intensity of incentive plans, which  the SASAC can take to  
stimulate the energy industry. Considering a linear transfer payment, which is ( ) = (1 )t C p q C  , 
> 0p , [0,1]q . When = 0q , the intensity of this incentive p lan is very low, because the 
government and consumers are the residual profit claimant. If 0 < <1q , that is a cost-sharing situation 
between the SASAC and the energy industry,so the intensity of the incentive plan is medium. It's a fixed-
price contact when =1q , which is a strong incentive plan because the energy industry is the residual 
profit claimant. As the utility function of the energy industry *( )U x  is a  decreasing function of x  and it 
wants to obtain more utility, it will work hard to improve its own efficiency.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper interprets a regulation problem of China in which the SASAC faces the energy in dustry 
with private information denoted by fuzzy variables. A principal-agent model is set up from the SASAC's 
point of view, with  the purpose of maximizing the SASAC's welfare function. Through analysis of the 
model, the Pontryagin maximum princip le is adopted to obtain a necessary condition of optimal solutions. 
Finally, a numerical example is given to find the optimal solution. 
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